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Abstract
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) as a priori eval-
uation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person interaction situation, we propose a group
value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a group
of players in a coalitional game when acting as a unit. We study its properties and we give an
axiomatic characterization. We motivate our proposal by means of some relevant applications
of the Shapley group value, when it is used as an objective function by a decision maker who
is trying to identify an optimal group of agents in a framework in which agents interact and
the attained benefit can be modeled by means of a transferable utility game. As an illustrative
example we analyze the problem of identifying the set of key agents in a terrorist network.
Keywords: Game Theory, TU games, Shapley value, group values.
1 Introduction
One of the most important one-point solution concepts in the framework of coalitional games
with side payments is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a), which proposes an allocation of re-
sources in multiperson interactions taking into account the power of players in their various co-
operation opportunities. Since the pioneering work of Lloyd S. Shapley, many different values
have been proposed, as for example the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969); the τ-value (Tijs, 1981) or
the least square values (Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo, 1998). There is also a vast literature fo-
cused on extensions, modifications and generalizations of the Shapley value: weighted Shapley
values (Shapley, 1953b); semi-values (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 1981); the value for large games
(Aumann and Shapley, 1974); values for NTU games which generalize the Nash bargaining so-
lution (Nash, 1950) and the Shapley value (Harsanyi, 1963; Shapley, 1969; Maschler and Owen,
∗This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spain.
1
1992); the Myerson value for games with graph restricted communication (Myerson, 1977), values
for games with coalition structures (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977; Hart and Kurz, 1983),
and others.
In this paper, we propose an extension of the Shapley value inspired in the question originally
addressed by Shapley in his seminal paper (see Hart 1987): How would one evaluate the prospects
of a player in a multiperson interaction, that is, in a game? Following this interpretation, we pro-
pose a group value as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a group of players in a multi-person
game when acting as a group, which takes into account the power of groups in their various co-
operation opportunities without imposing on the other agents any concrete coalition structure.
Mathematically, our proposal is related with the Shapley value of certain quotient games (Owen,
1977), also called merging games by Derks and Tijs (2000), which capture the situation when all
the members of a group commit themselves to bargain with the others as a unit.
A key observation in our proposal is that we do not need to suppose necessarily that the
players know each other nor agree to act jointly; instead, we assume the existence of an external
agent, the decision maker, that is able to coordinate the actions of the members of the group. This
is the case for instance of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, or secret societies; in which there
exists a leader (or a set of leaders) who sends a common signal that all the agents in the group
are willing to follow. In this work we describe alternative situations in which this type of external
coordination occurs.
Following Roth (1977), the ultimate aim of our proposal is to serve as an utility function for a
decision maker who is trying to find an optimal group under certain conditions - for instance, of a
given size- in those situations in which agents are immersed in a cooperative game. To be specific,
we illustrate its applicability in three different settings which share two relevant features: (i) the
objective is the selection of an optimal group, rather than the best individual; and (ii) the per-
formance of a group depends on its interaction with the rest of agents, which can also coordinate
themselves to form other coalitions. In this context, to maximize the characteristic function entails
a too restrictive assumption over the rest of agent’s behavior, i.e., only one scenario (mainly, the
worst one) is evaluated. On the contrary, we show that maximizing the value of a group allows
us to consider a more general setting, in which more than one scenario concerning other agents’
actions is taken into account.
Section 2 is devoted to a general presentation of the problem we deal with. We first introduce
some standard concepts and notation on Game Theory that will be used throughout this paper,
and then we describe three different cases in which the need for a group valuation arises. In
Section 3 we define the notion of group value, we introduce our proposal, which we call the Shapley
group value, we give an axiomatic characterization for it, and we analyze its properties both, as a
value, and as a set function. In Section 4 we explore one of its potential applications previously
considered in Section 2. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Acknowledgements. We would like to warmly thank Javier Castro for the simulation pro-
gram used to obtain the numerical results in Section 4.
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2 Motivation and notation
An n-person cooperative game in coalitional game with side payments, or with transferable utility
(TU game), is an ordered pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of n players and v : P(N) → IR is
a map assigning a real number v(S), called the value of S, to each coalition S ⊆ N, and where
v(∅) = 0. The real number v(S) represents the reward that coalition S can achieve by itself if all
its members act together.
Taking into account our main purpose, what is really measuring v(S) merits a detailed com-
ment. According to von Neumann-Morgenstern approach, “v(S) describes what a given collec-
tion of players (specifically, the set S) can obtain from their opponents (the set −S)”. Then, they
propose to consider the zero-sum two person game which results when all players in S cooperate
with each other on the one hand, and all players in N \ S (−S) cooperate on the other hand; in
these conditions, the value of that game will be v(S). Although assuming a zero-sum two-person
game would suggest a very pessimistic view, in which the value of coalition S is evaluated con-
sidering the rest of agents to be opponents, in general a maximin criteria is used for determining
the value of coalition S. In that case, a more neutral scenario in which players in N \ S do not in-
teract with players in S, which act as a unit, is taken into account in order to evaluate v(S). In any
case, using the characteristic function of the game as the utility function to evaluate the prospects
of a player in a game implies the valuation of only one scenario, which entails a too restrictive
assumption over the rest of agent’s behavior. In order to overcome this limitation, L. Shapley
introduces in 1953 the notion of value of the game, which can be used as the utility function for
games, and is -in words of Roth (1977)- “compatible with the existing utility function that defines
the games”.
Let Gn be the vector space of all TU games with fixed player set N, and identify (N, v) ∈ Gn
with its characteristic function v when no ambiguity appears. A value ϕ for TU games is an
assignation which associates to each n-person game (N, v) ∈ Gn a vector ϕ(N, v) ∈ Rn, where
ϕ(N, v)i ∈ R represents the value of player i, i ∈ N. Shapley (1953a) defines his value as follows:
φi(N, v) = ∑
S⊆N
i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where s = |S| denotes the cardinality of coalition S ⊆ N, and being (N, v) ∈ Gn. The value
φi(N, v) of each player admits different interpretations, such as the payoff that player i receives
when the Shapley value is used to predict the allocation of resources in multiperson interactions,
or his power when averages are used to aggregate the power of players in their various coopera-
tion opportunities. As we announced in the introduction, our proposal is based on the question
originally addressed by Shapley in his seminal paper: we interpret the value as the expectations of
a player in a game (N, v), so we will refer to φ(N, v) ∈ Rn as a valuation vector. Then, φ(N, v)i ∈ R
will measure the (a priori) value that playing the game (N, v) has for player i, and can be used as
an objective function for selecting key players.1 The approach just discussed is undertaken in the
next three cases, already considered in the literature:
1Note that in general v(i) 6= φi(N, v).
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(i) In Lindelauf, Hamers and Husslage (2013), the authors introduce a game-theoretic approach
to identify the key players in a terrorist network. They considered four different weighted
extensions of the connectivity game (Amer and Gimenez, 2004) to capture the structure of the
terrorist organization as well as additional individual information about the terrorists, and
then they proposed to calculate the Shapley value of each game in order to identify the key
players. In Section 4, where we analyze in detail this application, we recover the formal
definitions of those games.
(ii) In Narayanam and Narahari (2011), the authors also introduce a game-theoretic approach
to address the target set selection problem in the framework of diffusion of information. They
consider the linear threshold model (Schelling (1971), Granovetter (1978), and Kempe, Klein-
berg and Tardos (2005)) to model the role of the social structure in the sharing of information
and the formation of opinions dynamics. The propagation process in this case is character-
ized by a set of agents N, which are connected through a social network. The flow of avail-
able information is captured by a weight matrixW whose entries are understood as influence
weights; in particular, wij quantifies the weight that agent i assigns to agent j. It is assumed
that these weights are normalized in such a way that ∑j∈Ni wij ≤ 1, where Ni represents the
set of neighbors of agent i, for all i ∈ N. In this model, it is also assumed that each agent
has two possible states: active, if he has adopted the information that is being propagated,
and inactive otherwise. From a dynamic point of view, it is assumed that the status of the
agents may change as time goes by. At each date, agents communicate with their neighbors
in the social network and update their state. The updating process is simple: all agents that
were active in step (t− 1) remain active at step t; and every inactive agent at step (t− 1)
becomes active if the sum of the weights of his active neighbors’ from the previous period
is at least θi, a threshold which represents the weighted fraction of the neighbors of i that
must become active in order to activate agent i.
The authors define a TU game (N, v), where the value of coalition S is defined to be the
expected number of active nodes at the end of the diffusion process when initially all agents
in S are active, whereas all agents in N \ S are inactive, and assuming all thresholds θi are
chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1] initially. Then, they propose to calculate
the Shapley value of the game in order to rank the agents. Taking into account that the
k agents with highest Shapley value are not in general the optimal set of k agents, they
propose an heuristic procedure, based on the Shapley value of each agent and the social
network structure, to select the key set of k agents.
(iii) In Conklin, Powaga and Lipovetski (2004) the authors introduce a game-theoretic approach
for the identification of sets of key drivers in customer satisfaction analysis, on the basis of
Kano’s theory (Kano et al., 1984) of the relationship between product quality and customer
satisfaction, and the information given by a random sample of customers. The attributes
take the role of the players, and the characteristic function of the game measures the ability
of every group of attributes to predict the dissatisfaction level of customers. To be specific,
v(S) = P{∑
i∈S
Mi > 0 / D = 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
reach
− P{∑
i∈S
Mi > 0 / D = 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
,
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where Mi ∈ {0, 1} takes the value 1 if attribute i has failed, and 0 otherwise; and D ∈ {0, 1}
reflects the overall dissatisfaction (D = 1) with the product. The above probabilities are es-
timated through the opinions of a random sample of customers as proportions of the failed
within those who are dissatisfied (reach) and non-dissatisfied (noise). Then, the authors pro-
pose to use the Shapley value for ordering the attributes. Then, they add attributes to the list
of key dissatisfiers following that order until a point where the added noise overwhelms the
added reach. This problem is in fact a particular instance of a multicriteria decision prob-
lem, in which the aim is to rank or score alternatives according to several (often conflicting)
points of view, called criteria. This is done on the basis of the information given by the
decision maker, who essentially gives his preference over a given set of typical alternatives.
For a more general application of the Shapley value to multicriteria problems and subjective
evaluation the reader is referred to Grabisch et al. (2002) and Grabisch et al. (2008).
Note that in the examples considered above, there exists in fact an external decision maker who
is interested in finding an optimal group of agents, rather that an optimal agent:
(i) In that case, the police wants to identify a small group of agents to neutralize in order to
break up the criminal organization. Or, it could be the case, that they were interested in
selecting a small group of agents to mislead in order to optimally diffuse their own infor-
mation through the network (by using them as seed). In any case, the objective is to find a
key group of terrorists.
(ii) In the target set selection problem, the goal is to find a set of k key agents that would maximize
the spreading of information through the network.
(iii) In Conklin, Powaga and Lipovetski (2004) the authors’ goal is the identification of sets of
key drivers in customer satisfaction analysis taking into account Kano’s theory about the
relationship between product quality and customer satisfaction.
Remark that a direct use of the characteristic function v(·) to measure the value of a group is
not in general the best approach to solve this problem. Let us think for instance in the second
example. In that case, to maximize v(·) implies a pessimistic scenario in which none of the agents
out of coalition S whose diffusion power is being evaluated adopts the product spontaneously.
The same argument remains valid for the other two situations considered above. Thus, since
measuring the value of a group is a relevant question, and taking into account that the k more
valuable agents (from the individual point of view) do not form in general the most valuable
group of k agents, the need for a specific group valuation is clear. We propose to extend the
Shapley value to deal with groups in order to account for all possible scenarios. The group value
we propose serves the decision maker as a valuation of the average performance of each group.
3 The Shapley group value: definition and axiomatic characteri-
zation
In this framework, we give the following definition of a group value.
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Definition 1. Let Gn be the set of TU games with fixed player set N. A group value is a mapping
that assigns for every N ⊂ N and every v ∈ Gn a valuation vector ξg(v) ∈ R2n , where the real
number ξgC(v) represents the a priori value of group C ⊆ N in v, and such that ξ
g
∅(v) = 0
In order to define our proposal, we must consider what does group integration mean for the
application we have in mind. In this framework, group integration does not necessarily implies
that agents in C make an agreement to act jointly. For instance, going back to the diffusion of
information case, there exists a external agent who can activate the nodes to be used as seeds
to diffuse the innovation through the network, and the activated nodes are not in general aware
about the other selected seeds’ identities. The same occurs when the police selects a group of
terrorists to turn back into double agents, or to misinform in order to spread their misinformation
through the criminal organization network. Therefore, when evaluating group C’s expectations
we will evaluate them like a unit anyway, and we will adopt the merging of players approach of
Derks and Tijs (2000). In that case all the agents of C are replaced by a single “super–player” c, who
can act as a proxy of any agent in C. Formally,
Definition 2. (Derks and Tijs, 2000) Let (N, v) ∈ Gn, and let C ⊆ N be any non-trivial coalition,
1 < |C| < n. Then, in the merging game with respect to C, (NC, vC), the agent set N will become
NC = (N \ C) ∪ {c}, and the characteristic function describing the new situation will be given by
vC(S) =
v(S), if c /∈ S,v(S ∪ C) if c ∈ S, ∀ S ⊆ NC. (2)
The previous merging game is also called the quotient game (Owen, 1977) of (N, v) with respect
to the coalition structure, or in other terms to the system of a priori unions, on N ⊂ N given by the
partition PC = {C, {j}, j /∈ C} of N. We trivially extend the previous definition to comprise the
extreme cases C = {i}, i ∈ N, and C = N.
Definition 3. We define the Shapley group value to be the group value that assigns for every N ⊂N
and every v ∈ Gn the valuation vector (φgC(N, v))C⊆N given by:
φ
g
C(N, v) = φc(NC, vC), for all coalition ∅ 6= C ⊆ N and φ
g
∅(N, v) = 0,
where (NC, vC) is the merging game with respect to C.
Our goal will be to find an axiomatic characterization of the defined Shapley group value.
We first propose and analyze some interesting properties of a group value, which try to extend
to this setting the main properties involved in the many axiomatic approaches which have been
provided for the Shapley value.
Properties
Let ξg be a group value defined over
⋃
n≥1
Gn, and let (N, v) be any game in Gn, with n ≥ 1. Then,
ξg verifies:
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(i) G-structural equivalence, if ∑i∈N ξ
g
i (N, v) = ξ
g
N(N, v);
(ii) G-dummy player, if ξgC∪i = ξ
g
C + v(i), for any group C ⊆ N with i /∈ C, whenever i is a
dummy player for N (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i), for all S ⊆ N);
(iii) G-null player, if ξgC∪i = ξ
g
C, for any group C ⊆ N with i /∈ C, whenever i is a null player for
N (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S), for all S ⊆ N);
(iv) G-anonymity, if for all C ⊆ N, and for all permutations pi ∈ Πn of N, ξgpi(C)(pi(N),piv) =
ξ
g
C(N, v), where piv(S) := v(pi(S)), and being pi(S) = {pi(i) / i ∈ S};
(v) G-additivity, if ξgC(N, v + w) = ξ
g
C(N, v) + ξ
g
C(N, w), for every different games v and w de-
fined over a set of players N and for every C ⊆ N, where v + w is given by (v + w)(S) =
v(S) + w(S), for all S ⊆ N;
(vi) G-coalitional balanced contributions (or G-CBC for short), if for every two different players i
and j in N and any group C such that i, j /∈ C, we have
(ξ
g
C∪i(N, v)− ξ
g
C(N, v))− (ξ
g
C∪i(N\j, v−j)− ξ
g
C(N\j, v−j)) =
(ξ
g
C∪j(N, v)− ξ
g
C(N, v))− (ξ
g
C∪j(N\i, v−i)− ξ
g
C(N\i, v−i)), (3)
where v−i stands for the restriction of the characteristic function v to the set of players N\i;
(vii) G-symmetry over pure bargaining games (or G-SPB for short), if ξgC(N, uN) =
1
n−c+1 , for every
group C ⊂ N such that 1 ≤ |C| = c ≤ n = |N|, and for all n ≥ 1, where (N, uN) is the
unanimity game with respect to the grand coalition;
(viii) G-coalitional monotonicity, if ξgC(N, v) ≤ ξ
g
C(N, w), for every group C ⊆ T, and for all games
(N, v), (N, w) ∈ Gn such that v(S) = w(S), for all S 6= T, and v(T) < w(T);
(ix) G-strong monotonicity, if ξgC(N, v) ≤ ξ
g
C(N, w), for every group C ⊆ N, and for all games
(N, v), (N, w) ∈ Gn for which v(S ∪ C)− v(S) ≤ w(S ∪ C)− w(S), for all S ⊆ N \ C.
(x) G-positivity, if ξgC(N, v) ≥ 0, for all C ⊆ N, whenever the game (N, v) is monotonic (i.e.,
v(T) ≥ v(S), for each T and S such that T ⊇ S).
(xi) G-relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence, if ξgC(N, w) = aξ
g
C(N, v) +∑i∈S bi, for
every (N, v) ∈ Gn, a > 0 and b ∈ Rn, where w is given by w(S) = av(S) + ∑i∈S bi, for all
S ⊆ N;
(xii) G-coalitional strategic equivalence, if ξgC(N, v) = ξ
g
C(N, v+ λuT), for every (N, v) ∈ Gn, λ ∈ R,
C ⊆ N and ∅ 6= T ⊆ N \ C;
(xiii) G-fair ranking, if for every pair of games (N, v), (N, w) such that v(S) = w(S), for all S 6= T,
ξ
g
C1
(N, v) > ξgC2(N, v) implies ξ
g
C1
(N, w) > ξgC2(N, w), for all C1, C2 ⊆ T with |C1| = |C2|;
G-structural equivalence adapts coalitional structure equivalence (Albizuri, 2008; see also Hart
and Kurz, 1983) for this setting. Coalitional structure equivalence is a property of values for
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games with coalition structures that requires the solution to give the same results both when all
the players are joined and when nobody is joined.
G-dummy, G-null, G-anonymity, G-additivity, and G-relative invariance with respect to strate-
gic equivalence generalize their counterparts for individual values for general TU games. Note
that additivity of the group value may be replaced by the following property, which is consistent
with the interpretation of the group value as the expected utility of playing a game: “the group
value of a probabilistic mixture of two games (i.e., with probability p the game v is played, and
with probability p′ = 1− p, the game w is played) is the same mixture of the group values of the
two games” (Hart and Kurz, 1983).
G-coalitional strategic equivalence, which generalizes G-relative invariance with respect to
strategic equivalence to coalitions T ⊆ N with |T| ≥ 2, adapts the same property of individual
values, introduced by Chun (1989) to characterize the Shapley value by adding triviality (the
value of a null game is the null vector), efficiency and fair ranking -also defined by Chun (1989),
and that can be generalized to G-fair ranking-.
G-coalitional monotonicity and G-strong monotonicity generalize the corresponding mono-
tonicity properties considered by Young (1985), who characterizes the Shapley value by means of
efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Moreover, G-positivity extends positivity, intro-
duced by Kalai and Samet (1987).
G-coalitional balanced contributions, which together with G-symmetry over pure bargaining
games, plays a crucial role in the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley group value, general-
izes the balanced contribution property which adding efficiency characterizes the Shapley value
(Myerson, 1977). G-CBC states that the impact of player j’s presence over the interest of group
C ⊆ N \ {i, j} to rely on player i equals the impact of player i’s presence over the interest of group
the same group C to rely on player j, when those interests are measured by the corresponding
marginal increments.
G-SPB can be seen as a restriction2 of the neutrality to strategic risk property considered by Roth
(1977) to characterize the Shapley value as a utility function. Formally, let R be a preference re-
lation of a decision maker over positions and games. That is, a total preorder on N × Gn, where
an element (i, v) represents a position (the position i) in the game (N, v), that the decision maker
is evaluating (and comparing with other positions and other games). In this setting, Roth dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of risks: ordinary risk, involving the uncertainty which arises from
the chance mechanism involved in lotteries; and strategic risk, that involves the uncertainty which
arises from the interaction in a game of the strategic players.3 Roth (1977) states that a preference
relation  is neutral to strategic risk if (i, uS) ∼ (i, 1s u{i}), for all unanimity games uS (seen as pure
bargaining games). That is, the certainty equivalent of playing uS in position i should be to receive
1
s for sure.
Proposition 1. The previous properties, (i) to (xiii), hold for φg.
Proof. Observe that the individual value defined by φg over the one-person coalitions is the Shap-
ley value, so property (i), G-structural equivalence, follows from the Shapley value efficiency,
2In the sense that it is only imposed for pure bargaining games over the grand coalition N.
3Roth (1977) only considers as strategic players those who are not null.
8
taking into account that φgN(N, v) = v(N).
We check conditions (ii) to (v), and (viii) to (xiii), using the following common argument:
taking into account that φgC is the Shapley value of the superplayer c ∈ NC in (NC, vC), to analyze
the implications of the considered property over the merging game and, then, to rely on the
individual Shapley value properties. For instance, the G-null player property is clear because
φ
g
C∪i is the Shapley value of the superplayer (c, i) in (NC∪i, vC∪i), and this is equal to the Shapley
value of the superplayer c in (NC, vC) as the marginal contributions of i are zero.
With respect to property (vi), G-CBC, first let us remark that condition (3) is equivalent to:
ξ
g
C∪i(N, v)− ξ
g
C∪j(N, v) =
(ξ
g
C∪i(N\j, v−j)− ξ
g
C(N\j, v−j))− (ξ
g
C∪j(N\i, v−i)− ξ
g
C(N\i, v−i)). (4)
Also note that, by definition of the quotient game and the Shapley value, we obtain in this case
the following equalities:
φ
g
C∪i(N, v) = ∑
S⊆N\C
i,j/∈S
( s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)! (v(S ∪ C ∪ i)− v(S))+
(s + 1)!(n− c− s− 2)!
(n− c)! (v(S ∪ C ∪ i ∪ j)− v(S ∪ j))
)
,
φ
g
C(N\j, v−j) = ∑
S⊆N\C
i,j/∈S
( s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)! (v(S ∪ C)− v(S))+
(s + 1)!(n− c− s− 2)!
(n− c)! (v(S ∪ C ∪ i)− v(S ∪ i))
)
,
φ
g
C∪j(N\i, v−i) = ∑
S⊆N\C
i,j/∈S
s!(n− c− s− 2)!
(n− c− 1)! (v(S ∪ C ∪ j)− v(S)),
where the cardinals of N, C and S are respectively designed by n, c and s. Analogous expressions
are obtained for φgC∪j(N, v), φ
g
C(N \ i, v−i) and φ
g
C∪i(N \ j, v−j). Now it is enough to check that for
every S ∈ N\ with i, j /∈ S the coefficients of v(S ∪ C ∪ i ∪ j), v(S ∪ C ∪ i), v(S ∪ C ∪ j), v(S ∪ C),
v(S ∪ i), v(S ∪ j) and v(S) are the same in both sides of the equation in (4), and this is easily
deduced from the previous expressions. We leave the details to the reader.
It remains to check (vii), G-SPB. Consider the unanimity game with respect to the grand coali-
tion (N, uN), and a group C such that 1 ≤ c ≤ n. It is straightforward to see that the quotient
game (NC, (uN)C) is the unanimity game (NC, uNC ) with respect to the grand coalition NC, so
φ
g
C(N, uN) = φc(NC, (uN)C) =
1
n−c+1 , as desired.
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Next, we give our characterization of the Shapley group value. It must be remarked that
it is not a trivial extension of a characterization of the Shapley value, since we do not impose
any condition about the value of the individual agents out of group S when that group forms.
We have been forced to use in the same characterization group additivity and group coalitional
balanced contributions axioms. Thus, we should carefully check that all the considered axioms
are necessary to guarantee the uniqueness of the group value φg (see the Appendix).
Theorem 1. The unique group value over
⋃
n≥1
Gn verifying G-null player, G-additivity, G-CBC, and G-
SPB, is the Shapley group value φg.
Proof. We have proved that the axioms hold for the Shapley group value, so we are left with the
question of uniqueness.
First, we will prove uniqueness for all the elements of the basis4 {(N, uS)}S⊆N
S 6=∅
, for all n ≥ 2.
The proof will consist in a double induction over the cardinality of the player set N and the
cardinality of the unanimous coalition S ⊆ N.
Let ξg be a group value verifying (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v). Then, we will check that
ξ
g
C(N, uS) = φ
g
C(N, uS) := φc(NC, (uS)C) =

1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1 , if S ∩ C 6= ∅,
0 otherwise.
,
for all C ⊆ N, for all S ⊆ N, and for all n = |N| ≥ 2.
Let us prove that ξg coincides with φg for two-person games. For the unanimity game ({i}, ui)
with just one player, G-symmetry condition (v) implies that ξgi (N, ui) = 1. For the trivial game
({i}, u0), whit u0(i) = 0, G-null player implies ξgi (N, ui) = 0. Thus, let (N, v) be a two-person
game with N = {i, j}. For the unanimity game with respect to N, G-symmetry condition (v)
implies that ξgij(N, uN) = φ
g
ij(N, uN). For the unanimity game (N, ui), G-null player implies
ξ
g
j (N, ui) = ξ
g
∅(N, ui) := 0 and ξ
g
i (N, ui) = ξ
g
ij(N, ui) (5)
Now, G–CBC condition implies
ξ
g
i (N, ui)− ξ
g
j (N, ui) = (ξ
g
i ({i}, ui)− ξ
g
∅({i}, ui)− (ξ
g
j ({j}, u0)− ξ
g
∅({j}, u0)) = 1− 0− 0+ 0,
and, therefore, taking into account (5), ξg({i, j}, ui) = φg({i, j}, ui) holds.
So we may assume by induction that for every unanimity game (N, uS) with |N| < r we have
ξ
g
C(N, uS) = φ
g
C(N, uS) for any group C in N.
Consider then a unanimity game (N, uS) with |N| = r > 2. If S = N, then G-SPB implies
ξ
g
C(N, uN) = φ
g
C(N, uN) for any group C in N. Consider now the case S  N, in which there
4Recall that a game (N, v) is an unanimity game if there exists a coalition S such that for every T ⊆ N, v(T) = 1 if S ⊆ T,
and v(T) = 0 otherwise; in this case, the game is usually denoted by (N, uS). Unanimity games are a basis of the vector
space of the TU-games.
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is at least a player j ∈ N\S which by definition of unanimity game must be null. Let i be a
player in S. Again by G-CBC, taking C = ∅, since ξgj (N, uS) = ξ
g
∅(N, uS) = 0, we obtain that
ξ
g
i (N, uS) = ξ
g
i (N\j, uS|N\j), which in turn is equal to Φi(N\j, uS|N\j) = 1s by induction, and
then to Φi(N, uS). So we are done with the individual case C = {i} for |N| = r, for any coalition
S ⊆ N.
Now, let S ⊆ N with 1 ≤ s < n. Then, in order to prove
ξ
g
C(N, uS) = φ
g
C(N, uS), for all group C with c = |C| > 1.
we proceed by induction on the cardinality of C. So we take now 1 < r′ ≤ r, and we may assume
that ξgC(N, uS) = φ
g
C(N, uS) if |N| = r and |C| < r′. We will check that ξ
g
D(N, uS) = φ
g
D(N, uS) for
all D with |D| = r′. Since S  N, again there is a null player j in N. So, if j ∈ D, then D \ j is a
coalition of cardinal r′ − 1 and, thus, G-null player and the second induction hypothesis imply
ξ
g
D(N, uS) = ξ
g
D\j(N, uS) = φ
g
D\j(N, uS) = φ
g
D(N, uS).
Otherwise, if D does not contain any null player, then let i be a player in D ∩ S. By the second
induction hypothesis and G-null player property it holds
ξ
g
(D\i)∪j(N, uS) = ξ
g
(D\i)(N, uS) = φ
g
(D\i)(N, uS) = φ
g
(D\i)∪j(N, uS).
Hence, by G-CBC, taking C = D\i, and the first induction,
ξ
g
D(N, uS)− φg(D\i)∪j(N, uS) = (φ
g
D(N\j, uS|N\j)− φgD\i(N\j, uS|N\j))−
(φ
g
(D\i)∪j(N\i, uS|N\i)− φ
g
D\i(N\i, uS|N\i)) = φ
g
D(N, uS)− φg(D\i)∪j(N, uS),
and we are done.
So we have proved the uniqueness for the unanimity games. As these games are a base of Gn,
the additivity axiom guarantees such uniqueness for all the games in Gn. So we are done.
Now, we will analyze the behavior of the Shapley group value as a set function. Since one
of its main purposes is to serve as an objective function in order to find an optimal group, the
individual marginal contributions to a given group deserve a careful study.
Proposition 2. Let φg be the Shapley group value, and let (N, v) be any game in Gn, with n ≥ 1. Then,
(i) Monotonicity: φgC(N, v) ≤ φ
g
D(N, v), for every pair of coalitions C ⊆ D, if the game (N, v) is
monotonic, and
(ii) Group Rationality: φgC(N, v) ≥ v(C), for every C ⊆ N, if the game (N, v) is superadditive.
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Proof. Monotonicity follows from being
φ
g
C∪i(N, v)− φ
g
C(N, v) = ∑
S⊆N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c + 1)!
(
v(S ∪ i ∪ C)− v(S ∪ C)
)
+
(s + 1)!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c + 1)!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
)
≥ 0, (6)
for all coalitions C ⊆ N, and all players i /∈ C, whenever the game (N, v) is monotonic.
Group rationality follows from the individual rationality of the Shapley value. Note that every
quotient game (NC, vC), C ⊆ N, is superadditive if it is (N, v).
Superadditivity, i.e., φgC(N, v) + φ
g
D(N, v) ≤ φgD∪C(N, v), for every pair of disjoint coalitions
C ∩ D = ∅, can not be assured in general. In fact, when restricted to one person coalitions,
superadditivity is called mergeability by Derks and Tijs (2000). In that case, taking into account
Theorem 2 (Derks and Tijs, 2000), it follows that group C ⊆ N is mergeable in a game (N, v), i.e.,
∑
i∈C
φ
g
i (N, v) ≤ φ
g
C(N, v),
whenever all coalitions with positive Harsanyi dividend are either contained in C or have at most
one player in common with C. Derks and Tijs propose some interesting types of games for which
every coalition is mergeable, or mergeability can be guaranteed for certain kinds of coalitions.
As we have announced before, the k more valuable players are not in general the most valuable
group of k players, since individual mesures do not take into account the presence of complemen-
tarities and substitutabilities among the players. Proposition 4 shows how the Shapley group value
incorporates those relations among the players when evaluating the value of a group. Before
proving that result, we recall some concepts which will be used in the proposition.
Grabisch and Roubens (1999) introduce the notion of interaction indexes. Formally:
Definition 4 (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999). An interaction index Iv of the game (N, v) ∈ Gn is a
real valued function on P(N).
Here, Iv(S) should be interpreted as a measure of the extent of the profitability of the coopera-
tion among the members of S ⊆ N. In particular, they obtain the following result, which relays on
the second-order difference operator for a pair of players i, j ∈ N considered by Segal (2003), which is
defined as a composition of marginal contribution operators (i.e., first-order difference operators)
as follows:
∆2ij(S, N, v) = v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ j)− v(S ∪ i) + v(S) = ∆2ji(S, N, v), ∀ S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
and it is interpreted by Segal as a measure of complementarity of players i and j with respect to
the players in S.
Proposition 3 (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999). Let Iv be an interaction index. If it verifies:
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(LI) Linearity: Iv is linear on Gn.
(D) Dummy: If i ∈ N is a dummy player (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i)), then for every S ⊆ N \ {i},
S 6= ∅, Iv(S ∪ {i}) = 0, and Iv(i) = v(i).
(S) Symmetry: If Iv(S) = Ipiv(piS), for all S ⊆ N, and for all order pi ∈ Π(N); where the game piv is
defined by piv(piS) = v(S), and being piS = {pi(i), i ∈ S}.
Then, there exist real constants ps(n), s = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2, such that
Iv({i, j}) = ∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
ps(n)∆2ij(S, N, v), for all i, j ∈ N.
Specifically, we use a linear, dummy and symmetric interaction index defined as
ψij(N, v) := ∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
∆2ij(S, N, v), for all i 6= j ∈ N, (7)
applied to the pair of players i 6= c ∈ NC of the game (NC, vC). Here, ψci(NC, vC) measures the
extent of the profitability of the cooperation among the members of {i, c} ⊆ NC. The concept
of interaction index for two players was implicitly first considered by Owen (1972) who defined
the co-value qij(v) of i and j. The interaction index ψij(N, v) differs from Owen’s co-value in the
number of orders in which ∆2ij(S) is considered. Owen’s co-value takes into account only those
orders in which i arrives in the first place, then S players arrive, and then j arrives.
Now we are ready to present the desired result:
Proposition 4. Let φg be the Shapley group value, and let (N, v) be any game in Gn, with n ≥ 1. Let
C ⊆ N be any group in N, and let i /∈ C. Then, the marginal contribution of player i ∈ N \ C to the
group value of C equals:
MCgi (C, N, v) := φ
g
C∪i(N, v)− φ
g
C(N, v) = φi(N \ C, v|N\C) + ψci(NC, vC). (8)
Proof. Adding and subtracting the amount
∑
S⊆N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
)
13
to the above expression (6) of the marginal contribution MCgi (C, N, v) follows that:
MCgi (C, N, v) = ∑
S⊆N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
)
+
∑
S⊆N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c + 1)!
(
v(S ∪ i ∪ C)− v(S ∪ C)− v(S ∪ i) + v(S)
)
.
The first term is precisely the Shapley value of player i in the restricted game (N \C, v|N\C), where
players in C do not play a role. The second term can be expressed by means of the second-order
difference operators for the pair of players i, c ∈ NC, as follows:
∑
S⊆N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c + 1)!
(
v(S ∪ i ∪ C)− v(S ∪ C)− v(S ∪ i) + v(S)
)
=
∑
S⊆N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c + 1)! ∆
2
ic(S, NC, vC) =: ψci(NC, vC).
Let us illustrate the previous result by means of two simple examples in which the two more
valuable players do not form the most valuable group of two players.
Example 1. Let us consider the following 4-person game (N, v), with v(1) = 100, v(2) = v(3) =
v(4) = 0, v(N) = 150, and intermediate coalitions’ values:
S {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
v(S) 100 110 120 0 0 0 140 150 120 0
The above example is a slight modification of a horse market game in which Player 1 (the
seller) has a horse which has a value of 100 for him. Players 3 and 4 (the buyers) value the
horse at 150 and 140, respectively, in case of a swift transaction. Otherwise, if the transaction is
delayed, the horse’s value decrease to 120 and 110 for each player, respectively. Player 2 acts as
an intermediary who is able to accelerate the transaction procedure.
In this case, the two more valuable players, according to their individual Shapley values are
the seller (player 1) and the intermediary (player 2): φ(v) = (124 16 , 12
1
2 , 4
1
6 , 9
1
6 ). However, the
most valuable group of two agents is the one composed by the seller and the buyer who values
more the horse. In fact,
φ
g
{1,2}(v) = 131
2
3
< 124
1
6
+ 12
1
2
= φ1(v) + φ2(v)
φ
g
{1,4}(v) = 135 > 124
1
6
+ 9
1
6
= φ1(v) + φ4(v),
Players 1 and 4 are strong complementary players. Players 1 and 2 are however less complemen-
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tary:
MCg2 ({1}, N, v) = φ2(N \ {1}, v|N\1) + ψ12(N, v) = 0+ 7
1
2
,
MCg4 ({1}, N, v) = φ4(N \ {1}, v|N\1) + ψ14(N, v) = 0+ 10
5
6
.
Now, let us consider the following social network represented in Figure 1 as an undirected
graph (N, Γ), and the connectivity game (Amer and Gimenez, 2004), which is defined as
v(S) =
1, if S is connected in Γ and |S| > 1,0, otherwise, , for all S ⊆ N.
Figure 1: Social Network (N, Γ)
Here, S ⊆ N is a connected coalition in (N, Γ) if for every two players i 6= j in S, {i, j} ∈ Γ, or
there exists a path between them which consists of nodes in S. That is, there exists a a sequence of
nodes and edges pi(i, j) = {i = i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik = j}, with k ≥ 2 satisfying the property that for
all 1 ≤ r ≤ k− 1, {ir, ir+1} ∈ Γ, and ir ∈ S, for all 2 ≤ r ≤ k− 1.
In that case, the two more valuable players, according to their individual Shapley values are
the two centers of the satellite stars, players 4 and 6. φi(v) = − 8360 , for all the leafs i = 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9,
φ4(v) = φ6(v) = 139360 , for the two centers, and φ5(v) =
130
360 for the hub which intermediates
between players 4 and 6. However, the most valuable group of two agents is the one composed
by the hub and one out of the two centers. In fact,
φ
g
{4,6}(v) =
1
2
<
1
2
+
1
21
= φ
g
{4,5}(v).
4 Application: Detecting a target group in terrorist networks
We will illustrate now the application of the Shapley group value to the two terrorist networks
which have been considered by Lindelauf at al. (2013): the operational network of Jemaah Is-
lamiyah’s Bali bombing and the network of hijackers of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack.
For the first case, Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing attack, the authors use the game (N, vwconn).
Let (N, Γ) be the undirected graph which represents the terrorist network. The nodes in the finite
set N = {1, . . . , n} are the terrorists, whereas the edges -i.e., unordered pairs of distinct nodes-
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represent the known relationships between the terrorists. In Figure 2 is represented the terrorist
network they work with.
Figure 2: Operational network of JI’s Bali attack. Image taken from Lindelauf et al. (2013)
Then, Lindelauf et al. (2013) define the game (N, vwconn), which extends the connectivity game
of Amer and Gimenez (2004) using information about relationships. In that game, a coalition must
be connected in order to achieve a non-zero value. That is, players in coalition S must rely only
upon their own connections in order to communicate among themselves. Then, since a terrorist
cell tries to prevent discovery during the planning and execution phase of an attack, and taking
into account the available data about the existing relationships5, the authors define the power of
a coalition as the total number of relationships that exist within that coalition divided by the sum
of the weights (representing frequency and duration of interaction) on those relationships;
vwconn(S) =

∑i,j∈S
i 6=j
Iij
∑i,j∈S
i 6=j
fij
, if S is connected in Γ and |S| > 1,
0, otherwise,
, for all S ⊆ N, (9)
where fij is the weight assigned to relation {i, j} ∈ Γ in the terrorist network, Iij = 1, for all edge
{i, j} in Γ, and 0 otherwise.
We obtain the following results concerning groups from one to four individuals. Following
Castro, Gomez and Tejada (2009), and taking into account that the marginal contributions in the
extended connectivity games are computable in polynomial time, we have estimated with Monte
Carlo simulation the Shapley group value of the examples, also in polynomial time. The results
obtained are represented in Table 1, which includes the records for the best groups arranged in
decreasing order of importance.
5The authors collected the strength of existing relationships from Koschade (2006).
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Individuals Two agents Three agents Four agents
Samudra, 0, 358 {Samudra, Muklas}, 0, 453 {Samudra, Muklas,Azahari}, 0, 442 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Azahari}, 0, 466
Muklas, 0, 048 {Samudra, Azahari}, 0, 392 {Samudra, Muklas,Sarijo}, 0, 435 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Sarijo}, 0, 460
Feri, 0, 032 {Samudra, Sarijo}, 0, 386 {Samudra, Muklas,Patek}, 0, 435 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Patek}, 0, 460
Azahari, 0, 012 {Samudra, Patek}, 0, 386 {Samudra, Feri,Azahari}, 0, 430 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Ghoni}, 0, 453
Sarijo, 0, 005 {Samudra, Rauf}, 0, 384 {Samudra, Muklas,Ghoni}, 0, 429 {Samudra, Muklas,Azahari,Sarijo}, 0, 429
Table 1: Operational network of JI’s Bali attack rankings
According to the individual rankings for the JI network based on the Shapley value, the five
most valuable terrorists were, in decreasing order of importance: Samudra, Muklas, Feri, Azahari
and Sarijo.
With respect of groups of two terrorists, the most valuable group is that composed by the
two more important agents, {Samudra, Muklas}. However, the second group of size two in im-
portance is {Samudra, Azahari}, improving the group value of {Samudra, Feri}, which equals
0, 350, and takes the 15th place. In fact, Samudra has all direct contacts has Feri, and therefore
Feri’s presence in a group is somehow redundant if Samudra is already in it. According to what
it is known about the attack, ”Samudra, an engineering graduate, played a key role in the bombings”,
whereas Azahari is the bomb expert who was considered the ”brain” behind the entire operation.
Again, the most valuable group of three terrorist is {Samudra, Muklas,Azahari}. However,
when considering a bigger group of four terrorist, then {Samudra, Muklas, Feri, Azahari} has
the highest Shapley group value.
In the analysis of the terrorist network of the 11S, Lindelauf et al.’s starting point was the
version of the network in Figure 3, whose links come from terrorists that lived or learned together
(black edges) as well as some temporary links that were only activated just before the attack in
order to coordinate the cells. See Krebs (2002) for further information. The authors use the game
(N, vwconn2), which uses information about the individuals:
vwconn2(S) =
∑i∈S
wi, if S is connected in Γ and |S| > 1,
0, otherwise,
, for all S ⊆ N, (10)
where wi is the weight assigned to terrorist i ∈ N. The authors also determine the terrorist weights
in their analysis (see Table 5 in Lindelauf et al., 2013).
The results obtained by means of Monte carlo simulation (see Castro, Gomez and Tejada, 2009)
are depicted in Table 2, which includes the records for the best groups arranged in decreasing
order of importance.
According to the individual rankings for the Al Qaeda’s 9/11 network based on the Shapley
value, the most valuable terrorists were, in decreasing order of importance: A. Aziz Al-Omari
(WTC North cell), H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC South cell), Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC North cell), H. Hanjour
(Pentagon cell), M. Al-Shehhi (WTC South cell) and M. Atta (WTC North cell).
With respect of groups of two terrorists, the most valuable group is that composed by the
two more important agents, {A. Aziz Al-Omari, Al-Ghamdi}. However, the second group of
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Figure 3: 11S Social Network. Image taken from V.E. Krebs (Copyright c©2002, First Monday)
Individuals Two agents Three agents
A. Aziz Al-Omari (WTC-N), 6, 096 {Al-Omari, Al-Ghamdi}, 7, 405 {Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi}, 9, 236
H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC-S), 5, 578 {Al-Omari, M. Al-Sehhi}, 7, 392 {Al-Omari, H. Al-Ghamdi, Wd. Al-Shehri}, 9, 153
Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC-N), 5, 563 {Al-Omari, H. Hanjour}, 7, 368 {M. Al-Shehhi, H. Al-Ghamdi, Wd. Al-Shehri}, 9, 140
H. Hanjour (Pent), 5, 402 { Aziz Al-Omari, Wd. Al-Shehri}, 7, 324 { H. Al-Ghamdi, Wd. Al-Shehri, H. Hanjour}, 9, 074
M. Al-Shehhi (WTC-S), 2, 202 {Al-Omari, M. Atta}, 7, 156 { H. Al-Ghamdi, H. Hanjour, N. Al-Hazmi}, 8, 986
M. Atta (WTC-North), 1, 600 { H. Al-Ghamdi, H. Hanjour}, 7, 044 { Al-Omari, H. Al-Ghamdi, H. Hanjour}, 8, 963
Table 2: 11S-hijackers network rankings
size two in importance is {Aziz Al-Omari, M. Al-Sehhi}, improving the group value of {Aziz Al-
Omari, Wd. Al-Shehri}, which takes the 4th place. In fact, Wd. Al-Shehri is one out of the three
hijackers that crashed the plane into WTC South which forms a cycle in the terrorist network that
is connected to the rest of terrorist only via A. Aziz Al-Omari, who also belongs to the WTC North
cell. Thus, Wd. Al-Shehri presence in a group is not so necessary if A. Aziz Al-Omari is already
in it.
The most valuable group of three terrorist is {A. Aziz Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi}.
In that case, Wd. Al-Shehri, from WTC North cell, and H. Al-Ghamdi, from WTC South cell, are
displaced. Now, H. Hanjour, who is known to be the leader of WTC South cell, has displaced H.
Al-Ghamdi.
When considering a bigger group of four terrorist, then {A. Aziz Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-
Sehhi, Wd. Al-Shehri} has the highest Shapley group value. The first group with one representa-
tive per each cell occupies the 13th place, with a Shapley group value of φgD(N, w
conn2) = 10, 6311,
being {A. Aziz Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi, Z. Jarrah}. Note that Z. Jarrah, who is known
to be the leader of Pennsylvania cell is individually in the 8th position. The group of the four cell’s
leaders L = {M. Atta, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi, Z. Jarrah} is in the 48th position with a group
value of φgL(N, w
conn2) = 9, 1313.
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Recall that Lindelauf et al. (2013) carried out the analysis on the terrorist network of the nine-
teen hijackers which prepared and executed the attack (distributed in four cells). We extend their
analysis to a more dense network (see Figure 4) which included some people which did not take
direct part in the attack, but support the terrorists. In this event, the relative positions of the hi-
jackers change: the two poor connected terrorists from the WTC North cell, A. Aziz Al-Omari
and Wd. Al-Shehri, are not so relevant in the new network, since they are now better connected
through non-hijackers terrorists. According to the rankings for the Al Qaeda’s 9/11 hijackers
based on the individual Shapley value and the extended network6, the most valuable hijack-
ers were, in decreasing order of importance, N. Al-Hazmi (Pentagon), H. Hanjour (Pentagon),
M. Atta (WTC North), H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC South), Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC North) and Z. Jarrah
(Pennsylvania).
Figure 4: 11S extended SN. Image taken from V.E. Krebs (Copyright c©2002, First Monday)
The results obtained by means of Monte carlo simulation (see Castro, Gomez and Tejada, 2009)
are depicted in Table 3, which includes the records for the best groups arranged in decreasing
order of importance.
With respect to groups of two terrorists, the most valuable group is {N. Al-Hazmi, M. Atta},
which does not coincide with the two more important terrorists’ group. In that case, however,
the three and four people most valuable 3-group and 4-group are composed of the three and four,
respectively, most important hijackers from an individual point of view. Those groups, C3 and
C4, have group values of φ
g
C3
(N ∪M, wconn2) = 10, 675 and φgC4(N ∪M, wconn2) = 12, 529. Now,
6In which we have again considered the wconn2 game, with a zero weight for all the terrorist who do not take direct
part in the attacks.
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Individuals Two agents
N. Al-Hazmi (Pent), 6, 132 { N. Al-Hazmi, M. Atta}, 8, 424
H. Hanjour (Pent), 6, 089 { N. Al-Hazmi, H. Hanjour}, 8, 342
M. Atta (WTC-N), 5, 926 { H. Hanjour, M. Atta}, 8, 152
H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC-S), 1, 844 { N. Al-Hazmi, H. Al-Ghamdi}, 7, 201
Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC-N), 1, 701 { H. Hanjour, Z. Jarrah}, 7, 048
Z. Jarrah (Penn), 1, 688 {M. Atta, Z. Jarrah}, 7, 013
Table 3: 11S extended network rankings
the group L is in the twentieth position with a value of φgL(N ∪M, wconn2) = 10, 066.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced an extension of the classical game-theoretic concept of value to
the framework of groups. We define the group value as a vector whose components measure the
expectations of the coalition inside a TU-game, i.e. an evaluation of the prospects of the group
if they act together as an individual; in this sense, the group value must be understood as a
valuation vector. A key observation in our proposal is that we do not need to suppose necessarily
that the agents know each other nor agree to act jointly; instead, we assume the existence of an
external decision maker that is able and willing to evaluate the value of the different groups, and
in his case, find the optimal group who undertakes the appropriate collective action he is trying
to promote.
The main motivation of our work and in particular of the previous definitions was to obtain
a (marginalistic) extension of the Shapley value to the context of groups. Following the original
formulation of Shapley, who intended to apply his value to measure the expectations of players
in a game, and also keeping in mind the mentioned idea of the external decision maker, we have
performed the generalization of the Shapley value by means of the merging game defined by
Derks-Tijs in 2000. In this work, the authors develop a concept of super-player, who acts as a
proxy in a quotient game of all the players of the coalition whose value we do want to compute.
In order to show that our extension of Shapley is valid and interesting, we have proved that the
natural generalizations to the group framework of the usual properties of the (individual) Shapley
value hold for the Shapley group value. Moreover, we offer an axiomatic characterization of the
Shapley group value which, although includes the group version of null-player and additivity
properties, cannot be directly deduced from the usual characterizations in the individual context.
It is likely other axiomatic descriptions of the Shapley group value may exist.
We finish our paper by testing the validity of our methods in the identification of influent
groups inside a real terrorist network. The flexibility of the proposed approach allows to suppose
that our measure will be effective and usual in a variety of contexts and making use of different
interpretations of the Shapley group value. Let us think for instance in two of them.
In a global economy context, in which many firms present a complex interlocked shareholding
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structure, it may be difficult to asses a firm’s controllers. However, “a common intuition among
scholars and in media sees the global economy as being dominated by a handful of powerful transnational
corporation” (Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston, 2011). In that case, following the approach of Crama
and Leruth (2007), and Levy (2011), we can make use of the Shapley group value to detect a small
group of firms which in fact have a dominating power.
Another relevant application arises in the context of transportation network’s operation, where
the identification of sets of stations to defense (or maintain) in order to maximally preserve the
network’s operation is a relevant question to network protection against natural and human-
caused hazards, which has become a topical research topic in engineering and social sciences, as
Liu, Fan and Ordone˜z (2009) point out. In that case, following a game theoretical approach as
in Perea and Puerto (2013), the Shapley group value can serve security agencies for selecting a
group of stations to defense (or maintain).
However, it should be remarked that the problem of finding the optimal group, according to
some prearranged criteria, is a combinatorial problem that merits a more careful study. We are
aware of the need of heuristics in order to apply the Shapley group value to the group selection
problem.
Appendix
In the following we should check that all the axioms considered in Theorem 1 are necessary to
guarantee the uniqueness of the group value φg.
G-null player. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Define a value ξg in the following manner. If (N, v) is a null game,
ξ
g
C(N, v)=0 for every C ∈ N. Given a non-null unanimity game uS, with S ( N, define ξ
g
C(uS) as
ξ
g
C(N, uS) =

c−1
∑
k=0
αn−k, if C ∩ S = ∅,
1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1 +
n−s−1
∑
k=0
αn−k, if C ∩ S 6= ∅,
(11)
ξ
g
C(N, uN) =
1
n−c+1 , for all C ⊆ N, and then extend the value by additivity. It is clear that
ξ
g
i (N, uS) = α
n > 0 for all i /∈ S. So, G-null player does not hold. Let us check that ξg verifies
G-CBC over the class of unanimity games. If (N, uN), then G-CBC condition (4) trivially holds.
Let (N, uS) be a unanimity game with S ( N. If |S| = n− 1, then two cases are possible:
a) If i, j ∈ S, then ξgC∪i(N, uS) = 1s−|S∩C| +∑n−s−1k=0 αn−k = ξ
g
C∪j(N, uS) and (4) holds, since uS|N\i
and uS|N\j are null games.
b) If i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then S = N \ j, uS|N\i ≡ 0 and uS|N\j is a unanimity game w.r.t. the grand
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coalition N \ j. Thus (4) holds:
ξ
g
C∪i(N \ j, uN\j|N\j)− ξ
g
C(N \ j, uN\j|N\j) =
1
(n− 1)− (c + 1) + 1 −
1
(n− 1)− c + 1 = ξ
g
C∪i(N, uN\j)− ξ
g
C∪j(NuN\j).
If |S| < n− 1, then three cases are possible:
a) If i, j ∈ S, then ξgC∪i(N, uS) = 1s−|S∩C| +∑n−s−1k=0 αn−k = ξ
g
C∪j(N, uS) and (4) holds.
b) If i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then
ξ
g
C∪i(N \ j, uS|N\j) =
1
s− |S ∩ C| +
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k
and
ξ
g
C(N \ j, uS|N\j) =

c
∑
k=1
αn−k, if C ⊆ N \ S,
1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1 +
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k, otherwise.
Thus, if C ⊆ N \ S:
ξ
g
C∪i(N \ j, uS|N\j)− ξ
g
C(N \ j, uS|N\j) =
1
s
+
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k −
c
∑
k=1
αn−k = ξgC∪i(N, uS)− ξ
g
C∪j(N, uS)
If C ∩ S 6= ∅, then
ξ
g
C∪i(N \ j, uS|N\j)− ξ
g
C(N \ j, uS|N\j) =
1
s− |S ∩ C| +
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k −
( 1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1 +
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k = ξgC∪i(N, uS)− ξ
g
C∪j(N, uS)
)
c) If i, j ∈ N \ S, then C ∪ i ⊆ N \ S if, and only if, C ∪ j ⊆ N \ S and, therefore condition (4) can
be easily checked.
Now, since G-CBC condition is additive ξg satisfies it over
⋃
n≥1 Gn
G-additivity. Let ξg be another group value over (N, v) which is defined in the following way:
(A1) If there is at least a null player in N, or (N, v) is the unanimity game with respect to the
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grand coalition N, then ξgC(N, v) = φ
g
C(N, v) for every group C in N.
(A2) Otherwise, ξ
g
C(N, v) = φ
g
C(N, v) + k, being k 6= 0 a fixed constant.
It is easily checked that G-null-player and G-SPB hold for ξg. We will check that the property
of coalitional balanced contributions G-BMC also holds for this value. Note that all differences
in (4) match ξgD(L, w) with ξ
g
D′(L, w), for some coalition L ∈ {N, N \ i, N \ j} and some game
w ∈ {v, v−i, v−j}.
Taking into account that φg = ξg in case (N, v) is some of the games in the first case (A1), and
in the second one the k′s cancel, it holds:
ξ
g
C∪i(N, v)− ξ
g
C∪j(N, v) = φ
g
C∪i(N, v)− φ
g
C∪j(N, v),
ξ
g
C∪i(N \ j, v−j)− ξ
g
C(N \ j, v−j) = φ
g
C∪i(N \ j, v−j)− φ
g
C(N \ j, v−j),
ξ
g
C∪j(N \ i, v−i)− ξ
g
C(N \ i, v−i) = φ
g
C∪j(N \ i, v−i)− φ
g
C(N \ i, v−i),
G-CBC property holds for φg, and so the property does so for ξg, and we are done.
Note that we can modify ξg defining ξgi (N, v) = Φi(N, v), for all i ∈ N, and ξ
g
N(N, v) = v(N),
for all N ⊆N, and the same result holds.
G-CBC. Define a value ξg in the following manner. If (N, v) is a null game, ξgC(N, v)=0 for every
C ∈ N. Given a non-null unanimity game uS with S ( N, define ξgC(uS) as
ξ
g
C(uS) =

0 if C ∩ S = ∅,
ξ
g
C(uS) = 1, if S ⊆ C,
|S ∩ C| × |S\C| if C ∩ S 6= ∅ and C ∩ S 6= S,
(12)
ξ
g
C(N, uN) =
1
n−c+1 , for all C ⊆ N, and then extend the value by additivity.
Observe that all axioms but G-CBC hold. The unique one that needs a bit of discussion is the
G-null player axiom, which holds when considering the base of unanimity games because in uS
the null players are precisely the players outside S, and therefore:
ξ
g
C∪i(N, uS) = 0 = ξ
g
C(N, uS), if S ∩ C = ∅,
ξ
g
C∪i(N, uS) = 1 = ξ
g
C(N, uS), if S ⊆ C, and
ξ
g
C∪i(N, uS) = |S ∩ (C ∪ i)| × |S\(C ∪ i)| = |S ∩ C| × |S\C| = ξ
g
C(N, uS), otherwise,
for all player i /∈ S. Then, taking into account that the Harsanyi dividend cS(N, v) of any coalition
S containing null players in the game (N, v) equals zero, G-null player property holds for any
n-person game (N, v) ∈ Gn, for all N ⊆N.
Let us check by means of a concrete example that the G-CBC axiom fails in this case. Consider
(N, uS) with |N| = 3, and S = {1, 2}. In the notation of the axiom, take C = {1}, i = 2, and j = 3.
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Then:
ξ
g
{1,2}(N, uS) = 1, ξ
g
{1,3}(N, uS) = 1× 1 = 1, ξ
g
{1,2}(N\3, uS|N\3) = 1, ξ
g
1(N\3, uS|N\3) = 1/2,
and ξg{1,3}(N\2, uS|N\2) = 0 = ξ
g
1(N\2, uS|N\2), because the game (N\2, uS|N\2) is null. It is clear
now that the two sides of the equalities that define the axiom do not coincide in this case.
Note that we can modify ξg defining ξgi (N, uS) = Φi(N, v), for all i ∈ N, and ∅ 6= S ( N, for
all N ⊆ N, and the same result holds. Probably it is easy to find more examples by defining the
value over C ∩ S (when C ∩ S 6= ∅) as another appropriate function of (|C ∩ S|, |S\C|).
G-symmetry over pure bargaining games. Define a value ξg in the following manner. If (N, v) is
a null game, ξgC(N, v)=0 for every C ∈ N. Given a non-null unanimity game uS, define ξg(N, uS)
as ξgC(N, uS) =
|C∩S|
|S| , for all group C ⊆ N, and then extend the value by additivity.
Observe that all axioms but G-SPB hold. The G-null player axiom trivially holds when con-
sidering the base of unanimity games. Then, since cS(N, v) = 0 for all S containing null players
in the game (N, v), G-null player property holds in general. Moreover, G-additivity follows from
the definition.
Let us check that the G-CBC axiom holds. Let (N, v) be any n-person game with n ≥ 2. Let C
be any group in N of cardinality c ≤ n− 2, and let i, j ∈ N \ C. Then:
• If i, j ∈ N \ S, then (4) holds since all the involved differences are zero because i and j are
null players in the three games.
• If i, j ∈ S, then |(C ∪ i)∩ S| = |C ∩ S|+ 1 = |(C ∪ j)∩ S|. Thus, ξgC∪i(N, uS)− ξ
g
C∪j(N, uS) =
0, and (4) holds because the games (N \ i, uS|N\i) and (N \ j, uS|N\j) are null.
• If i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then ξgC∪i(N, uS) − ξ
g
C∪j(N, uS) =
1
s = ξ
g
C∪i(N \ j, uS|N\j) − ξ
g
C(N \
j, uS|N\j), and (4) holds because uS|N\i ≡ 0.
Clearly, G-SPB fails, so we are done.
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